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ABSTRACT
In order to communicate successfully, speakers have to take into account which information they
share with their addressee, i.e. common ground. In the current experiment we investigated how
and when common ground affects speech planning by tracking speakers’ eye movements while
they played a referential communication game. We found evidence that common ground exerts
an early, but incomplete effect on speech planning. In addition, we did not ﬁnd longer planning
times when speakers had to take common ground into account, suggesting that taking common
ground into account is not necessarily an effortful process. Common ground information thus
appears to act as a partial constraint on language production that is integrated ﬂexibly and
efﬁciently in the speech planning process.
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Introduction
A key question in language production is when and how
speakers take into account which knowledge is shared
between speaker and addressee (common ground) and
which information is only available to the speaker (privi-
leged ground) (Clark & Marshall, 1978). According to
Grice’s Maxim of Quantity, speakers should make their
contributions as informative as is required for the
current purpose of an interaction (Grice, 1975). Infor-
mation that is not shared between interlocutors and
that is uninformative should therefore not inﬂuence
the language production process. However, speakers
do not always successfully ignore privileged information.
Imagine a situation in which a speaker sees two bottles
of different sizes, the smallest of which is occluded
from their addressee’s point of view. If the speaker asks
the addressee to hand him the mutually visible bottle,
he can either describe it using a size adjective (the
large bottle) or a bare noun (the bottle). According to
Grice’s Maxim of Quantity, the speaker should not use a
size-contrasting adjective, because the smaller bottle is
occluded from the listener’s point of view. However, speak-
ers in this situation regularly use a size adjective (Horton &
Keysar, 1996; Wardlow Lane & Ferreira, 2008; Yoon, Koh, &
Brown-Schmidt, 2012). In this case, an overspeciﬁcation
does not prevent the listener from identifying the intended
referent. However, speakers also overspecify referring
expressions when an overspeciﬁed expression can cause
a misunderstanding (Wardlow Lane & Ferreira, 2008), and
when they are instructed to conceal privileged information
(Wardlow Lane, Groisman, & Ferreira, 2006).
The question why speakers fail to completely ignore
privileged information is still under debate, and two
main theories have emerged to explain these results.
According to Constraint-Based Processing models, speak-
ers keep their addressee in mind from the earliest stages
of utterance planning in a probabilistic, constraint-based
way, resulting in early effects of common ground
(Brennan & Hanna, 2009; Hanna, Tanenhaus, & Trueswell,
2003; Horton & Gerrig, 2002; Tanenhaus & Trueswell,
1995). In this view, privileged and common ground infor-
mation act as partial constraints for language processing.
When privileged information is salient, as in the example
with the additional bottle above, speakers may fail to
ignore it. In contrast, the Monitoring and Adjustment
theory proposes that keeping track of the distinction
between shared and privileged information during utter-
ance planning is resource-intensive and often not necess-
ary (Horton & Keysar, 1996). According to this view,
speakers initially design their utterances from their own
egocentric perspective, and common ground only
comes into play at a later stage when speakers monitor
their utterance (Keysar, Barr, & Horton, 1998). This
model thus predicts that speakers initially do not dis-
tinguish between privileged and common ground infor-
mation during utterance planning. Monitoring and
adjusting the initial utterance plan is considered effortful
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and requires additional planning time (Horton & Keysar,
1996). In this view, speakers fail to ignore privileged infor-
mation when their initial egocentric plan is not corrected.
In the current experiment, we investigated when and
how shared and privileged visual information affect the
production of referring expressions. Both the Con-
straint-Based Processing models and the Monitoring
and Adjustment theory predict that privileged infor-
mation can affect the production of referring
expressions, but they make different predictions about
when speakers take into account the distinction
between shared and privileged ground. Constraint-
Based Processing Models predict early effects of
common ground, although privileged information may
not always be successfully ignored. The Monitoring and
Adjustment theory predicts effects of common ground
only after an initial egocentric planning stage. Previous
studies have mostly focused on speakers’ adjective use.
In the current experiment, we also measured eye-track-
ing data and planning durations in order to gain more
insight into the timing of the underlying processes. We
used the high temporal resolution of eye-tracking to
test whether speakers distinguish between shared and
privileged information during the early stages of plan-
ning a referring expression. In addition, we investigated
whether ignoring privileged information during
language production is resource-intensive as predicted
by the Monitoring and Adjustment model by measuring
speech planning durations. If speakers monitor and
adapt their initial egocentric utterance plans when they
design referring expressions that take into account
their addressee’s perspective, this should result in
longer planning durations. Finally, we were interested
in whether speakers avoid egocentric descriptions
when those threaten communicative success. We there-
fore introduced two types of conditions. In the advisable
audience design condition, a failure to ignore privileged
information was overinformative, but the intended refer-
ent was clear. In the obligatory audience design con-
dition, failing to ignore privileged information made it
impossible for the listener to infer the intended referent.
This condition, used here for the ﬁrst time, thus provides
a stronger test for speakers’ sensitivity to communicative
success than the advisable audience design condition.
Method
Participants
Twenty-two pairs of native Dutch speakers played a com-
puterised version of a referential communication game
(Keysar, Barr, Balin, & Brauner, 2000; Yoon et al., 2012).
Participants did not know each other before the start
of the experiment. Data from one pair were excluded
from the analyses due to experimenter error, and data
from another pair were excluded because the speaker’s
responses could not be coded. The remaining partici-
pants consisted of 6 men and 34 women (mean age:
21.5 years, range 18–29). Half of the eye-tracking data
from one pair were lost due to equipment malfunction.
The remaining eye-tracking data from this pair were
included in the ﬁnal dataset.
Procedure
A coin toss was used to randomly assign participants to
the roles of speaker and listener for the duration of the
experiment. The speaker and listener were seated at sep-
arate monitors, separated by a screen to prevent them
from seeing each other’s monitor. Throughout the exper-
iment, participants saw opposite sides of a 4 × 4 array
containing objects of different sizes (Figure 1). Each
array contained three closed slots on each player’s side,
allowing us to manipulate which objects were in
common ground (i.e. visible to both participants).
Participants completed 288 trials in total. On each trial,
the speaker described a speciﬁc object in the array in a
way that would allow the listener to select the correct
object from the array. During the ﬁrst phase of the trial
(3000 ms), the speaker and listener each saw their side
of the array. Then the speaker was cued by means of a
red circle around one of the objects, and described this
object for the addressee (Figure 2). On the basis of the
speaker’s description, the listener selected an object by
means of a mouse click. The cued object was always
mutually visible. Speakers were instructed not to use
descriptions referring to the position of the object in
the array, such as “upper left corner” or “rightmost”.
Figure 1. Overview of the set-up. Speakers and listeners viewed
opposite sides of 4 × 4 arrays containing objects. Some objects
were only visible to one of the participants, allowing us to manip-
ulate which objects were in common ground. Speakers’
responses and eye movements were recorded.
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Participants successfully refrained from using such spatial
descriptions (see Results section). In addition, they were
instructed not to ask questions or give each other feed-
back during the experiment. Speakers were not given
any on-screen or verbal feedback about the listener’s per-
formance during the experiment. Participants were
seated next to each other in the lab, so speakers could
occasionally hear the listeners’ mouse clicks.
Before starting the experiment, participants practised
the task together using a real array and real objects. They
jointly placed the objects in the array, viewed each
other’s perspective, and performed the task. Then partici-
pants practised the task on the computer; during part of
these test trials they were allowed to see both monitors
and they could give feedback to each other.
Speakers’ descriptions were recorded and their eye
movements were tracked using a head-mounted
EyeLink II eye-tracker (SR Research) with a 250 Hz
sampling frequency. We tracked both pupil and corneal
reﬂection whenever possible. The distance between
the speaker and the monitor was approximately 57 cm.
We calibrated the eye-tracker at the start of the exper-
iment, after a break halfway through the experiment
and whenever deemed necessary. Drift correction was
performed before each trial.
Materials
Wemanipulated the number, size and visibility of the rel-
evant objects to create six conditions (Figure 3). In the
audience design conditions (left column Figure 3),
speakers saw an extra competitor object that the listener
could not see. In the obligatory audience design con-
dition, speakers saw three relevant identical objects of
different sizes: one target object, one occluded competi-
tor object and one mutually visible object. The target
object was always the medium-sized object of those
three objects. If speakers described this object from
their own perspective, they would call it the medium
object. In this case, their addressee had a 50% chance
of selecting the wrong object. On the other hand, if
speakers considered the perspective of their addressee,
they would ignore the occluded object and call the
medium-sized object small or large. In the advisable audi-
ence design condition, speakers saw two relevant identi-
cal objects of different sizes: one target object and one
occluded competitor object. Given that their addressee
could see the target object but not the competitor
object, speakers did not have to use a contrasting size
adjective. However, unlike in the obligatory audience
design condition, listeners were still able to select the
correct object if the speaker did not consider the per-
spective difference.
We created two types of control conditions in which
speakers and listeners saw the same number of relevant
objects. In the linguistic control conditions (middle
column Figure 3), the occluded object was replaced by
another, unrelated object. As a result, speakers saw one
relevant object fewer in these conditions than in the
audience design conditions. We called these linguistic
control conditions, because speakers were expected to
Figure 2. Trial sequence from the speaker’s and the listener’s
point of view. In the ﬁrst phase of each trial, speakers and listen-
ers each viewed their side of the array. In the second phase of the
trial, the speaker described the object that was indicated with a
red circle, and the listener selected an object using the cursor.
Figure 3. Overview of the six conditions from the speaker’s point
of view, and the expected speaker responses. In the audience
design conditions, speakers can either describe the target
objects (circled in red) from their own perspective (“medium
glass”, “small vase”), or take into account their addressee’s per-
spective (“small glass”, “vase”). There is no relevant perspective
difference in the linguistic and visual control conditions. The
green squares were added to the ﬁgure for clariﬁcation, and
were not visible to the participants during the experiment.
They indicate the objects that differ between conditions.
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produce the same description on these trials as on suc-
cessful trials in the audience design conditions. In the
visual control conditions (right column Figure 3), the
object that was occluded in the audience design con-
ditions was visible to both participants. As a result, speak-
ers and listeners could both see all relevant objects. We
called these visual control conditions, because speakers
see the same number of relevant objects as in the audi-
ence design conditions. Neither of these control con-
ditions required the speaker to take into account the
perspective difference with their addressee in order to
communicate successfully.
We created 12 different empty virtual arrays. The
arrays were ﬁlled with 6–8 objects chosen from a total
of 22 objects. Objects were selected from the Object
Databank, stimulus images courtesy of Michael J. Tarr,
Center for the Neural Basis of Cognition and Department
of Psychology, Carnegie Mellon University (http://www.
tarrlab.org/). Each object could appear in four different
sizes to make sure that participants could not rely on
absolute size. Depending on the condition, speakers
saw one, two or three relevant objects of the same
type but of different sizes. The remaining objects were
ﬁllers that also appeared in sets of one, two or three
objects of the same type to make sure participants
could not predict which objects would be relevant. We
made sure that the speaker and the listener always saw
the same total number of objects in a trial by adding
additional ﬁller objects to the occluded slots if needed.
We have created a visual overview depicting the trial
construction, which can be found in the supplementary
materials. For each speaker, we created 288 trials by con-
structing 48 triplets of obligatory trials and 48 triplets of
advisable trials. Each triplet consisted of one audience
design trial, one linguistic control trial and one visual
control trial. Figure 3 shows examples of one obligatory
triplet (top row) and one advisable triplet (bottom row).
The target and competitor objects per triplet were iden-
tical in type, size and location, with the exception of the
occluded object in the linguistic control condition. The
number, proportion and location of ﬁller objects were
kept constant within each triplet, but we varied the
type and the size of the ﬁller objects in order to avoid
memory effects. As can be seen in Figure 3, the audience
design and the linguistic control trials in a triplet were
created using the same array. The array used in the
visual control condition differed from this array in the
location of one closed slot. Each of the 12 virtual arrays
was used to create 4 obligatory and 4 advisable triplets
of trials. The only thing these triplets had in common
was the array that was used as a starting point. Target
object–location pairings were only repeated within a
triplet, i.e. three times throughout the experiment.
During the experiment, trials were presented in blocks
of six trials that were created using the same array. Each
block contained nomore than one trial from a triplet. The
order of the trials within each block was randomised, and
we randomised the blocks of trials so that neighbouring
blocks did not use the same array. We created unique
stimulus lists for each participant, detailing which
object should appear where in each array. Based on
these lists, the stimulus pictures, as presented to the par-
ticipants, were assembled online in Presentation
software.
Data analysis
We coded the sound ﬁles ofﬂine for adjective use. For the
obligatory trials, we coded the use of small/large and
medium adjectives (klein/groot and middelgroot in
Dutch). For the advisable trials, we coded the use of
bare nouns and small/large responses. In addition, we
coded errors, false starts, repairs, speech unrelated to
the task, and responses exceeding the response interval
of 3500 ms, and removed trials that contained any of
these from further analysis (10.45% of trials). Listener per-
formance was calculated by determining whether listen-
ers clicked in the right slot within the 3500 ms-response
interval. Finally, we computed planning durations (from
cue onset until speech onset) and speaking durations
(from speech onset until speech offset) from the sound
ﬁles using a custom-made Matlab script. The script ﬁl-
tered and smoothed the waveform, determined an
initial speech onset and offset by looking for sustained
periods of silence and speech in the spectrogram and
then calculated a more precise speech onset and offset
by using increasingly smaller windows and lower
thresholds. Informal inspection of the speech waveforms
revealed that these calculations were accurate (example
waveforms are included in the supplementary materials).
The statistical analyses were performed in R version
3.0.3 (R Core Team, 2014). We used the lmer function
from the lme4 package version_0.999999-4 (Bates,
Mächler, Bolker, & Walker, 2015) to ﬁt the linear mixed
models and we built up the models from a simple to a
more complex model. The linear mixed models
(Baayen, Davidson, & Bates, 2008) included a random
intercept for subjects, a by-subjects random slope for
condition, a random intercept for target object indicating
which of the 22 possible objects was used as target
object, and condition and number of objects as ﬁxed
effects. Models were estimated using maximum likeli-
hood estimation. The factor condition had three levels
(audience design, linguistic control and visual control)
and the factor number of objects had three levels (six,
seven or eight objects). We used the same model in
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every analysis, except that the reference distribution was
changed depending on the dependent measure: Poisson
for count data (number of ﬁxations per trial), binomial for
binary data (adjective use) and Gaussian for continuous
data (planning durations, speaking durations and ﬁx-
ation durations). Obligatory and advisable data were
analysed separately. The obligatory conditions con-
tained more relevant objects than the advisable con-
ditions, so we could not compare them directly.
The main effect of condition was tested by comparing
a complete model containing all random and ﬁxed
effects to a model in which the ﬁxed effect of condition
was removed (the by-subjects random slope for con-
dition remained in the model). For each dependent
measure, two planned contrasts were performed in
order to compare the audience design condition with
each of the control conditions. We used the glht function
from the multcomp package version 1.3-2 (Hothorn,
Bretz, & Westfall, 2008) to run these planned compari-
sons. More information about the data analysis can be
found in the supplementary materials.
Results
Adjective use
We computed the percentage of each type of response
for the different conditions to ﬁnd out how often speak-
ers took their addressee’s perspective into account when
producing a referring expression. For the obligatory
trials, we treated the presence of the adjectives small
or large as opposed to medium as a binary dependent
variable; for the advisable conditions, we treated the
presence of a bare noun as opposed to a size adjective
(small or large) in the speakers’ descriptions as a binary
dependent variable.
Speakers adapted their language use to their addres-
see’s perspective in the majority of audience design trials
(Figure 4), yet they failed to ignore privileged information
on all trials. In the obligatory audience design condition,
speakers mainly produced small/large responses
(89.88%), although they also used medium responses
(10.12%). Medium responses are accurate descriptions
of the target object from the speakers’ perspective, but
do not allow the listener to uniquely identify the intended
referent. As expected, speakers mostly produced utter-
ances that contained a small/large size adjective
(97.32%) in the linguistic control condition and mainly
medium responses (98.59%) in the visual control con-
dition. We found a signiﬁcant main effect of condition
on the use of small/large size adjectives (χ2(2) = 41.71, p
< .001). Both the difference in adjective use between the
obligatory audience design condition and the linguistic
control condition (b = 3.75, SE = 0.51, p < .001) and the
difference in adjective use between the obligatory audi-
ence design condition and the visual control condition
were signiﬁcant (b =−8.77, SE = 0.72, p < .001).
In the advisable audience design condition, speakers
generally took their addressee’s perspective into
account. They mostly produced bare nouns (79.84%),
although they also produced small/large responses
(20.16%). In the linguistic control condition, speakers
mainly produced bare nouns (87.62%), and in the
visual control condition they predominantly used small/
large responses (98.90%). We found a signiﬁcant main
effect of condition on the use of bare nouns (χ2(2) =
39.88, p < .001). Both the difference between the advisa-
ble audience design condition and the linguistic control
condition (b = 1.64, SE = 0.28, p < .001) and the difference
between the advisable audience design condition and
the visual control condition were signiﬁcant (b =−6.60,
SE = 0.60, p < .001).
Overall listener accuracy was high: listeners selected
the intended object on 93.60% of the obligatory trials
and 97.70% on the advisable trials. As a manipulation
check we looked speciﬁcally at listeners’ performance
on audience design trials on which speakers described
the target object without taking their addressee’s per-
spective into account (i.e. saying medium in the obliga-
tory audience design trials and using a size adjective in
the advisable audience design trials). This was a small
subset of trials, unequally divided over participant pairs
(obligatory data: 2.98% of trials; advisable data: 6.14%
of trials). On obligatory audience design trials, listeners
only selected the correct object in 36% of these ambig-
uous trials; on advisable audience design trials, listeners
were successful in 98.15% of trials. This conﬁrms that
our advisable/obligatory manipulation worked as
expected: not taking the addressee’s perspective into
Figure 4. The percentages of speakers’ small/large and bare
noun responses for the obligatory (left) and advisable data
(right). Bars indicate standard error of the mean. Speakers
were expected to produce such responses in the audience
design conditions if they took their addressee’s perspective
into account.
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account forced the listener to guess the referent in the
obligatory audience design trials, but not in the advisable
audience design trials.
Planning and speaking durations
We computed speakers’ planning durations (from cue
onset to speech onset) based on the sound recordings
to test whether ignoring privileged information during
utterance planning is resource-intensive. We found no
signiﬁcant main effect of condition in both the obligatory
data (χ2(2) = 1.82, p = .40) and the advisable data (χ2(2) =
0.84, p = .66). Figures of the mean planning durations per
condition are included in the supplementary materials.
We also calculated speaking durations (from speech
onset to speech offset). If ignoring privileged information
is a resource-intensive process, this might also lead to
longer speaking durations. We found a signiﬁcant main
effect of condition on speaking durations, both for the
obligatory (χ2(2) = 26.23, p < .001) and the advisable
data (χ2(2) = 45.65, p < .001). No signiﬁcant difference in
speaking time was found between the obligatory audi-
ence design condition and the linguistic control con-
dition (b =−17.76, SE = 8.39, p = .067). Speaking
durations were shorter in the obligatory audience
design condition than in the visual control condition
(b = 86.54, SE = 12.38, p < .001), most likely because
the Dutch word middelgroot has more syllables than
the other size adjectives (klein and groot). We found sig-
niﬁcant differences in speaking duration between the
advisable audience design and the linguistic control
condition (b = −26.61, SE = 8.96, p < .01) and between
the advisable audience design condition and the
visual control condition (b = 224.43, SE = 17.52, p < .001).
However, when we removed the advisable audience
design trials in which the speaker did not take the addres-
see’s perspective into account (i.e. the speaker produced
a size adjective), the difference between the advisable
audience design condition and the linguistic control
condition disappeared (b = 15.95, SE = 14.34, p = .46).
Figures of the mean speaking durations per condition
are included in the supplementary materials.
Number of ﬁxations per trial
In order to measure when privileged information affects
the production of referring expressions, we computed
the mean number of ﬁxations on the occluded competi-
tor object in the audience design conditions and on the
objects in the same locations in the associated control
conditions (the objects in the green squares in
Figure 3). We focused our analysis speciﬁcally on the
planning duration window, i.e. in each trial, the time
between the moment the array with the cued object
was presented and the time the speaker started
talking. For both the obligatory and the advisable data,
we found that speakers ﬁxated an occluded competitor
object (audience design conditions) more than an unre-
lated control object (linguistic control), but less than a
mutually visible competitor object (visual control).
Figures 5 and 6 show how the proportion of ﬁxations
on the target and occluded object changes over time
and give an overview of the number of ﬁxations per
trial. Figures 5(a) and 6(a) clearly show that speakers
initially ﬁxate the target object they have to describe,
and then consider the other objects in the array.
We found a signiﬁcant main effect of condition on the
number of ﬁxations per trial in the obligatory data, (χ2(2)
= 52.28, p < .001). We found signiﬁcantly more ﬁxations
per trial on the occluded competitor object in the obliga-
tory audience design condition compared to the
occluded control object in the linguistic control con-
dition (b =−1.57, SE = 0.15, p < .001). We found signiﬁ-
cantly less ﬁxations per trial on the occluded
competitor object in the obligatory audience design con-
dition compared to the mutually visible object in the
visual control condition (b = 0.89, SE = 0.12, p < .001). To
rule out that these differences were driven by the small
percentage of obligatory control trials on which speakers
responded with a medium response, we ran the same
analysis including only trials in which speakers’
responses took into account the listener’s perspective
(i.e. a medium response in the visual control condition,
a small/large response in the audience design and lin-
guistic control conditions). The differences remained sig-
niﬁcant in this analysis. Across the obligatory conditions,
the mean number of ﬁxations per trial is relatively low,
even when the competitor object was relevant (visual
control condition). Some participants reported that
they paid special attention to objects that appeared in
triplets during the ﬁrst half of the trials, which may
have allowed them to plan their utterance after the
cue without additional ﬁxations on the other objects.
We observed a similar pattern in the advisable data.
We found a signiﬁcant main effect of condition on the
number of ﬁxations per trial, (χ2(2) = 41.99, p < .001).
We found a signiﬁcant difference in the mean number
of ﬁxations per trial between the advisable audience
design condition and the linguistic control condition
(b = −1.44, SE = 0.11, p < .001) and between the advisa-
ble audience design condition and the visual control
condition (b = 0.31, SE = 0.063, p < .001). This pattern
remained even when we only included the trials in
which speakers’ responses took into account the listen-
er’s perspective (i.e. an adjective in the visual control
condition, a bare noun in the advisable audience
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design and linguistic control conditions). These results
show that speakers already distinguish between
common and privileged ground while planning their
utterance, although they do not completely ignore pri-
vileged information.
Total ﬁxation duration per trial
We computed the total duration of ﬁxations on the
occluded competitor object in the audience design
conditions and on the objects in the same locations
in the associated control conditions. We again limited
the analysis to ﬁxations during the planning duration
window. Fixations that exceeded the planning duration
window were truncated and we treated trials without
ﬁxations on the occluded object as missing data.
Speakers ﬁxated the unrelated occluded object in the
linguistic control condition in only 6.49% of obligatory
linguistic control condition trials, and on 16.08% of
advisable linguistic control trials. Given that there
were so few of these trials, we did not contrast the
audience design conditions and the linguistic control
conditions for this dependent variable. An overview
of the average total ﬁxation durations can be found
in Figures 5(c) and 6(c).
Speakers looked longer at mutually visible objects
(visual control conditions) than at objects that were
occluded from the listener’s point of view (audience
design conditions). We found signiﬁcant main effects of
condition in both the obligatory (χ2(2) = 14.15, p < .001)
and the advisable data (χ2(2) = 27.12, p < .001). We
found a signiﬁcant difference in total ﬁxation duration
between the obligatory audience design condition and
the visual control condition (b = 31.82, SE = 9.41, p < .01).
Similarly, speakers spent less time looking at the occluded
competitor object in the advisable audience design con-
dition than at the mutually visible object in the visual
control condition (b = 22.53, SE = 7.16, p < .01). These
results again support the ﬁnding that speakers already
treat common and privileged information differently
while planning their utterance.
Discussion
In this experiment, we investigated the effect of privi-
leged information on the production of referring
Figure 5. Eye-tracking results for the obligatory data. (A) Proportions of speakers’ ﬁxations to the target and occluded objects from the
moment speakers were cued until the end of the trial. Solid lines indicate ﬁxations to the target object; dashed lines represent ﬁxations
to the occluded competitor object, the occluded competitor object or the mutually visible competitor object. Bounded lines indicate the
standard errors. (B) Mean number of ﬁxations (C) and total ﬁxation time during the planning duration window on the occluded com-
petitor object in the obligatory audience design condition, on the occluded ﬁller object in the linguistic control condition and on the
mutually visible competitor object in the visual control condition.
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expressions. Speakers mainly produced referring
expressions that took into account their addressee’s
visual perspective. However, the availability of privileged
information also led to the production of utterances that
did not take this perspective difference into account.
These ﬁndings are in line with previous studies using
similar paradigms (Wardlow Lane et al., 2006; Yoon
et al., 2012). Interestingly, speakers even failed to com-
pletely ignore privileged information when it harmed
communication (i.e. the obligatory audience design con-
dition). In a previous study, Wardlow Lane and Ferreira
(2008) also found that speakers were not able to fully
ignore privileged information even when it threatened
communicative success. However, in their study target
objects were in privileged ground in certain ﬁller trials,
meaning that speakers could not systematically ignore
privileged ground information. In the current exper-
iment, speakers could fully ignore occluded objects
throughout the experiment, yet even threats to commu-
nicative success did not prevent occasional interference
of privileged information.
In addition to studying the form of speakers’ referring
expressions, we collected planning durations and eye-
tracking data to address when and how privileged infor-
mation affects the production of referring expressions.
Speakers ﬁxated occluded competitor objects less than
relevant competitor objects both in terms of the
number of ﬁxations and the total ﬁxation duration. This
suggests that speakers did not initially treat privileged
information in an egocentric manner as predicted by
the Monitoring and Adjustment hypothesis, but that
they take into account which objects are visible to their
communication partner. More speciﬁcally, speakers
used the information that was available to them in the
ﬁrst half of each trial to distinguish between common
and privileged ground when they were planning their
referring expressions. Despite this early distinction,
speakers did not fully ignore privileged information
when planning their referring expression. We found
more ﬁxations on the occluded target objects than on
unrelated occluded objects. This shows that speakers’
general success at producing utterances that took into
account their addressee’s perspective was not the
result of fully ignoring all occluded objects. Fixations to
the occluded competitor object might result from speak-
ers’ occasional failure to ignore their own perspective.
Figure 6. Eye-tracking results for the advisable data. (A) Proportions of speakers’ ﬁxations to the target and occluded objects from the
moment speakers were cued until the end of the trial. Solid lines indicate ﬁxations to the target object; dashed lines represent ﬁxations
to the occluded competitor object, the occluded competitor object or the mutually visible competitor object. Bounded lines indicate the
standard errors. (B) Mean number of ﬁxations (C) and total ﬁxation time during the planning duration window on the occluded com-
petitor object in the advisable audience design condition, on the occluded ﬁller object in the linguistic control condition and on the
mutually visible competitor object in the visual control condition.
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Alternatively, speakers may deliberately ﬁxate the
occluded object to check whether it is in common
ground, for example, because they failed to look at the
occluded object during the viewing phase or as part of
monitoring during speech production. Based on our
data, we cannot exclude either option. To test the predic-
tion of the Monitoring and Adjustment theory that audi-
ence design should lead to additional planning time
(Horton & Keysar, 1996), we computed and compared
planning durations. However, unlike Horton and Keysar
(1996), we did not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant differences in plan-
ning duration between the audience design conditions
and the control conditions. One important difference
between these experiments is that in our experiment
participants had the opportunity to view the array and
objects before they had to describe the target object.
We included the viewing phase, because in most real-
life communicative settings, speakers also have the
opportunity to process their environment before they
start talking. The viewing phase may have facilitated
the speech planning process by allowing speakers to
compute which objects were in common ground
before they started planning their utterances. In addition,
we repeated the same 22 images scaled to different sizes
during the experiment, which may have allowed speak-
ers to learn to identify absolute object size and may
have thus facilitated target object naming over the
course of the experiment. However, we consider this
possibility unlikely given that the objects had different
sizes to begin with and could appear on screen in four
possible sizes, making it hard to determine absolute
object size. Taken together, our results show that
common ground does not function as a complete con-
straint on the production of referring expressions, but
does exert an early effect during utterance planning.
Speakers tried to use the information that was available
to them during the ﬁrst half of each trial to restrict
common ground when they were planning their utter-
ance, as reﬂected in the lower number of ﬁxations on
the occluded object during planning in the second half
of the trials. When speakers ﬁxated the occluded object
during planning, this often did not prevent them from
tailoring their referring expression for their addressee.
These results support Constraint-Based Processing
models. In this view, common and privileged ground
act as probabilistic constraints to guide language proces-
sing in combination with other constraints such as
context (Brown-Schmidt & Hanna, 2011). Given the lack
of differences in planning durations and speakers’ rela-
tive success at tailoring their referring expressions for
their addressee, weighing the available shared and privi-
leged information appears to be a relatively efﬁcient
process. The ﬁnding that common ground functions
merely as a partial constraint is perhaps best understand-
able when you consider that in many communicative
situations the goal of the interaction is exactly to
provide privileged information (e.g. giving directions or
responding to questions). Maybe speakers’ attention to
privileged objects should therefore be thought of as a
useful feature of communicative language processing
rather than a failure to ignore irrelevant information. In
addition, referring expressions that contain uninforma-
tive privileged information often do not prevent the
addressee from identifying the intended referent,
although they may temporarily confuse the addressee
(Engelhardt, Bailey, & Ferreira, 2006).
Our ﬁndings of early and partial effects of common
ground on language production are similar to previous
ﬁndings in language comprehension research showing
early effects of common ground in reference resolution
(Hanna et al., 2003; Heller, Grodner, & Tanenhaus, 2008;
Nadig & Sedivy, 2002). This suggests that common
ground may affect language production and language
comprehension in similar ways.
Conclusion
In line with previous studies using similar paradigms
(Wardlow Lane et al., 2006; Yoon et al., 2012), we found
that speakers cannot completely ignore privileged infor-
mation during language production and that the avail-
ability of privileged information can lead to the
production of utterances that do not take the addres-
see’s visual perspective into account. However, we
found no evidence that adapting to your addressee’s
visual perspective requires additional planning time,
suggesting that audience design is not necessarily effortful.
Combined, these results suggest that the available privileged
and shared information can efﬁciently constrain language
production. These ﬁndings support Constraint-Based Proces-
sing models that predict that common and privileged infor-
mation is incorporated into language processing in a
probabilistic fashion. Our results show that common
ground does not exert an all-or-nothing inﬂuence on
language production. Instead, common ground inﬂuences
the production process as a partial constraint already
during utterance planning.
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